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Abstract
Social accountability in the health sector has been promoted as a strategy to improve the quality
and performance of health providers in low- and middle-income countries. Whether improvements
occur, however, depends on the willingness and ability of health providers to respond to societal
pressure for better care. This article uses a realist approach to review cases of collective citizen ac-
tion and advocacy with the aim to identify key mechanisms of provider responsiveness. Purposeful
searches for cases were combined with a systematic search in four databases. To be included in
the review, the initiatives needed to describe at least one outcome at the level of frontline service
provision. Some 37 social accountability initiatives in 15 countries met these criteria. Using a realist
approach, retroductive analysis and triangulation of methods and sources were performed to con-
struct Context–Mechanism–Outcome configurations that explain potential pathways to provider re-
sponsiveness. The findings suggest that health provider receptivity to citizens’ demands for better
health care is mediated by health providers’ perceptions of the legitimacy of citizen groups and by
the extent to which citizen groups provide personal and professional support to health providers.
Some citizen groups activated political or formal bureaucratic accountability channels but the effect
on provider responsiveness of such strategies was more mixed. Favourable contexts for health
provider responsiveness comprise socio-political contexts in which providers self-identify as activ-
ists, health system contexts in which health providers depend on citizens’ expertise and capacities,
and health system contexts where providers have the self-perceived ability to change the system
in which they operate. Rather than providing recipes for successful social accountability initiatives,
the synthesis proposes a programme theory that can support reflections on the theories of change
underpinning social accountability initiatives and interventions to improve the quality of primary
health care in different settings.
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Introduction
Citizen participation in health policies and service delivery is receiving
increasing attention as part of efforts to develop more people-centred
health systems (Sheikh et al. 2014; WHO 2015). Citizen participation
is expected to lead to improvements in quality, accountability and
equity of health services. Collective action by citizens who demand
greater accountability for failures in public social services is often
referred to as ‘social accountability’ or ‘external accountability’
(Cornwall and Gaventa 2000; Cleary et al. 2013). The concept of so-
cial accountability has its roots in political science, theories of public
administration and development studies, including rights-based
approaches and participatory governance. In health systems litera-
ture, social accountability is seen as a means of strengthening commu-
nity participation (Molyneux et al. 2012). It implies that political and
governmental actors, including public service providers, are held to
account for their actions and decisions by citizens. Public providers
are thereby expected to actively respond to citizens’ demands, requir-
ing a behavioural change towards more openness towards discussing
poor performance and willingness to improve the power of service
users and accountability, and eventually to adapt service delivery
practices (McNeil and Malena 2010; Molyneux et al. 2012; Joshi
2013). Social accountability is more likely to achieve such behav-
ioural change when use is made of rewards and (the prospect of) sanc-
tions, such as public shaming, in the process of demanding improved
services (McNeil and Malena 2010). Social accountability can be dis-
tinguished from ‘internal’ or ‘bureaucratic’ accountability referring to
mechanisms such as supervision and performance discipline within
the health system (Wild et al. 2012; Cleary et al. 2013). Studies of
human resources for health argue that monitoring and feedback from
both external actors (patients, citizens and communities) and internal
actors (managers, supervisors and colleagues) is a key determinant of
health worker motivation and performance (Franco et al. 2002;
Willis-Shattuck et al. 2008). Social accountability is considered to be
particularly relevant to contexts where regulation through internal ac-
countability measures is weak or where formal political and judicial
channels are inaccessible to the majority of citizens, in particular the
poor (Shukla et al. 2013; Fox 2015).
Recent literature reviews have provided useful insights into the in-
ternal functioning of citizen groups and their impact on community
empowerment, state and government responsiveness, human develop-
ment and health outcomes (Gaventa and Barrett 2010; Gaumer et al.
2011; McLoughlin and Batley 2012; Croke 2012; Molyneux et al.
2012; Ringold et al. 2012; Joshi 2013, 2014; Rifkin 2014). A few stud-
ies consider the effect of social accountability on health service pro-
viders (e.g. Berlan and Shiffman 2012; Joshi 2014; Fox 2015) but
reaching conclusions is challenging because of mixed results and the
context-sensitivity of such initiatives. The existing literature identifies
three broad contextual domains that influence health provider respon-
siveness to societal demands. First, health system factors have a signifi-
cant impact on responsiveness. These factors include the nature of
competition between health providers, the level of provider autonomy,
the relative importance of community priorities vis-!a-vis funder or na-
tional priorities and the relative importance of social accountability
vis-!a-vis internal accountability (Gaumer et al. 2008; Berlan and
Shiffman 2012; Wild et al. 2012; Cleary et al. 2013; Batley and Harris
2014). For example, provider responsiveness to the public may be con-
strained if professional careers depend on the goodwill of direct super-
visors or political connections in the recruitment processes (Acosta
et al. 2013; Therkildsen 2014). Second, broader contextual factors
have an influence on social accountability and provider responsiveness,
including histories of citizen-state engagement and experiences with ac-
tivism or contestation and conflict (O’Meally 2013). Third, some au-
thors highlight the local level context of social accountability
initiatives, such as the presence and quality of ‘voice’ of citizens, the
local politics of participation, as well as providers’ attitudes to and re-
sources for citizen engagement (McCoy et al. 2012; Cleary et al.
2013). For example, health providers’ understanding of the role of citi-
zen groups or their perspective on service monitoring by non-
professionals may make them more or less receptive to citizen initia-
tives (Berlan and Shiffman 2012; Cleary et al. 2013; George et al.
2015). Joshi (2014) stresses that components of social accountabil-
ity initiatives, such as information collection, demand articula-
tion and presentation, can influence responsiveness differently.
Responsiveness of health providers to citizens’ concerns is thus the re-
sult of a combination of the broader governance and health system
context, features of the social accountability initiative and motives and
perceptions of providers at a particular point in time. Hence, social ac-
countability is increasingly recognized as a complex phenomenon lead-
ing researchers, practitioners and policymakers to stress the need to
clarify ‘pathways to change’ and to unpack the ‘black boxes’ of out-
comes of social accountability (Fox 2015; Grandvoinnet et al. 2015).
This article aims to contribute to understanding of how social ac-
countability initiatives, in different contexts, influence health pro-
vider responsiveness to citizens’ demands. It is based on a theory-
driven review of cases of collective citizen engagement and advocacy
in low- and middle-income countries. It takes a new perspective on
the evaluation of social accountability, complementing other recent
reviews (McNeil and Malena 2010; Acosta et al. 2013; Cleary et al.
2013; Joshi 2013; Fox 2015; George et al. 2015; Grandvoinnet et al.
2015). The insights can help researchers, policymakers and practi-
tioners reflect on the theories of change of social accountability
initiatives.
Key Messages
• The evaluation of the effect of social accountability on health service providers has been challenging. A range of citizen
actions is associated with the general concept of social accountability and citizen–provider relations are context spe-
cific. In order to address this complexity, a realist approach for the review of evidence was applied.
• The findings provide insights into the perspectives, reasoning, agency and abilities of health providers to respond to
citizens’ concerns and hence provide a more nuanced picture of the potential of social accountability for the improve-
ment of health services. The authors emphasize the need to evaluate intermediate effects, such as attitudinal or behav-
ioural change of participants, of social accountability initiatives.
• This review suggests a programme theory that may help practitioners and policymakers to identify social accountability
strategies that are likely to work in their contexts. It is a preliminary theory that could be further explored through exist-
ing and new empirical studies.
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Review methodology
For this study, a realist approach to review of literature was used.
Realist review represents an approach to diversify and mix methods
of systematic review in order to respond to an increasingly varied set
of policy questions in international development. It is a theory-
driven approach focused on the underling programme theory and
mechanisms driving interventions (Snilstveit et al. 2012). Our study
is based on a protocol (Lodenstein et al. 2013) and guided by realist
synthesis publication and quality standards and training materials
(Wong et al. 2013a, b; RAMESES Project 2014) and other examples
of reviews (Rycroft-Malone et al. 2012; Jagosh et al. 2014). This
section outlines the rationale for using a realist approach as well as
the methods used for data searching, extraction, analysis and
synthesis.
Rationale for using a realist approach to review
Our choice of synthesis methods was informed by our study ques-
tions, the purpose of the synthesis, the status of current conceptual-
izations of social accountability, and the nature of existing studies
and evidence (Pawson et al. 2004).
Based on a first scoping exercise of existing primary and secondary
studies on social accountability, the authors identified two main ques-
tions for the review: what are outcomes of social accountability initia-
tives at the frontline of service provision? And how, and under what
conditions, do these outcomes come about? In order to respond to
these questions, the authors adopted a mixed methods approach to lit-
erature synthesis with an emphasis on the realist approach. Our first
research question was expected to describe the types of social ac-
countability initiatives and outcomes that are reported in literature.
Our second question is more analytical and aims to explore explan-
ations for outcomes including contextual factors and health providers’
reasoning and behaviour vis-!a-vis social accountability initiatives.
Such subtle behavioural dimensions would remain hidden in standard
methods of systematic review. Realist review is one of the approaches
to systematic review that goes beyond questions on effectiveness.
Rather than judging the effect of programmes (‘what works’) such as
in traditional systematic reviews, realist review aims to develop under-
standing and explanation. It is an interpretative approach that sup-
ports the unpacking of causal pathways of complex interventions or
phenomena by asking the question ‘what works for whom under
which circumstances?’ (Pawson et al. 2004; Jagosh et al. 2014).
As outlined in the introduction, social accountability initiatives
are complex: they do not directly lead to outcomes in health service
delivery. From a realist point of view, it is rather the health pro-
viders’ response to the incentives, resources or persuasion strategies
provided by citizen groups that triggers change. A realist approach
supports the identification of such mechanisms of human reasoning
and behaviour. These mechanisms are further influenced by the
broader context in which the initiatives take place. Therefore, it will
be difficult to transfer lessons from one context to the other, unless
patterns in the production of outcomes are identified. Researchers
try to identify the link between ‘contextual factors’ (C) and ‘mech-
anisms’ (M) that, together, contribute to ‘outcomes’ (O). By analy-
sing multiple social accountability initiatives, we aimed to identify
such patterns (CMO-configurations) that constitute tentative mini-
theories of change informing decisions and actions (Pawson et al.
2004; Blamey and Mackenzie 2007; McCormack et al. 2013). So,
rather than providing a list of potential outcomes or contextual fac-
tors to take into account in social accountability, our purpose was
to produce concrete theories that would help policymakers and
practitioners reflect on how their particular initiative could be suc-
cessful in their particular context.
A final consideration is the fact that, because of its multi-
disciplinary use, there is no generally accepted definition of social
accountability; descriptions of the concept include broad notions of
social movements and citizen participation as well as more narrowly
defined interventions, such as patient complaint boxes and commu-
nity scorecard projects. Also, research findings on social account-
ability are reported in both academic and grey literature,
representing a range of research paradigms and methodologies. A
realist approach can support the synthesis of complex evidence from
different initiatives and a diversity of sources because it takes CMO
configurations as units of analysis rather than programmes, inter-
ventions, activities, contexts or types of studies (Pawson et al. 2004;
Snilstveit et al. 2015). Hence, it is able to acknowledge and build
upon the diversity of theories, concepts, disciplines and research
methods in the social accountability literature. The choice of a real-
ist review methodology has implications for data searching, extrac-
tion, analysis and synthesis methods. These are well described and
compared with systematic review methods by Pawson et al. (2004).
Articulation of a programme theory
As a first step in realist review, we developed a programme theory
that makes explicit the components, actors and ways of working of
a social accountability initiative. Through a scoping exercise and
preparatory sessions with the authors and external experts, we
explored the assumptions that underpin social accountability initia-
tives. We developed a rough programme theory, a description and
diagram that helped to guide the review, adapted by further evi-
dence as the review progressed. Our initial theory comprised one
main CMO (see Figure 1) whereas the eventual programme theory
comprises multiple CMO configurations and linkages.
Search strategy
The review aimed to cover the breadth (review question 1) as well as
the depth (review question 2) of social accountability initiatives.
Therefore, a systematic search was combined with purposive searches
of the literature. After an initial scoping period and the collection of
academic and grey literature from websites of social accountability
networks, we conducted a systematic literature search of four data-
bases: Medline, Sociological Abstracts, International Bibliography of
Social Sciences and Web of Science. The search was conducted in
September 2014 with the assistance of a research librarian. Search
keywords combined terms related to social accountability initiators
[e.g. committees, civil society organizations (CSO), movements], the
health sector and the country. Annex S1 (supplementary file S1) pro-
vides the detailed search terms used for the Web of Science that were
adapted to other databases, depending on the specific database re-
quirements. Publication dates from 2003 to 2014 were selected. The
emergence of the topic of accountability in service delivery is often
associated with the appearance of the 2004 World Development
Report, published in the year 2003 (World Bank 2003). Therefore,
we took that year as the starting point. Figure 2 presents the steps of
study identification, screening and inclusion.
Screening and study selection
Titles and abstracts were screened to meet the following criteria:
the study needed to (1) examine or describe an intervention,
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reform or case that explicitly aimed at strengthening collective citi-
zen engagement (rather than cases of individual patient empower-
ment) to address weaknesses in health policies or services in the
public sector (rather than improving health seeking behaviour); (2)
be written in English (because of time constraints); (3) be located
in low- and middle-income countries; and (4) be primarily empir-
ical. The papers that met these criteria were read in full; one au-
thor read all of them and the second and third authors read every
third and sixth paper. We divided the primary research papers into
two categories: those that reported on responsiveness outcomes of
providers, policymakers or other ‘public’ or ‘state’ agents or on re-
lational outcomes (category A) and those that did not report rele-
vant outcomes but were expected to provide evidence on context
or mechanisms (category B). An inclusion decision in either of the
categories was based on consensus between two authors or three
in the case of doubts. In total, 87 articles reported responsiveness
outcomes at different levels of which 40 reported on outcomes at
service provision level. These 40 sources form the basis of the syn-
thesis in this paper. The remaining papers were added to the se-
cond set of papers (category B), and some of them were used in
later stages of the review to explain outcomes. Each of the 40
papers described one or more social accountability initiative, and
some papers discussed the same initiative, covering a total of 37
initiatives. Papers describing initiatives (category A) were pub-
lished in scientific journals (n¼23) or in book chapters and work-
ing papers (n¼17). Study designs included case studies (both
descriptive and analytical), randomized control trials, longitudinal
descriptive studies (including ethnographic studies), participatory-
action research reports and evaluations. Rather than formal
before-and-after evaluations, many authors used retrospective ana-
lysis of experiences and lessons learned with regard to the imple-
mentation of an initiative or policy.
Quality appraisal
In realist review, articles and papers are judged on their relevance
and methodological rigour (Pawson et al. 2004). Relevance pertains
to the presence of evidence to further inform the initial theory.
Papers are not expected to provide full evidence; some papers may
emphasize outcomes, others context, and others processes and mech-
anisms. Data from one study can be used to make sense of a pattern
in another, and other sources may be used to build explanations
(Pawson 2006). Given this approach, we purposefully included all
types of studies, including from grey literature. Grey literature sour-
ces are very valuable in realist review because they usually contain
more contextual richness than peer-reviewed journal articles (Booth
et al. 2013). We assessed methodological rigour for grey literature
and book chapters by judging the credibility and coherence of the
methods, sometimes contacting authors or relevant websites for in-
formation about peer review procedures. In some papers, particularly
in non-evaluative studies, it was not clear whether associations be-
tween actions and outcomes were based on empirical data or on au-
thor’s opinions. In these situations, we did not discard the papers but
triangulated the content with other empirical studies to support such
interpretations. Reflections by authors sometimes also enriched our
explanations. When such studies are used in the results section, they
are distinguished from primary evidence.
Data extraction and analysis
The objective of data collection was to (1) identify the features of so-
cial accountability initiatives, (2) identify the outcomes associated
with the social accountability initiative and (3) configure the explan-
ation of how and under which circumstances these outcomes come
about. Data related to objectives 1 and 2 were extracted with the
Context (meso and macro): norms, values, gender rela!ons; poli!cal, economic, cultural, social, 
technological and environmental context; health system characteris!cs
Fear for exposure, 
public or professional 
Reprisal, reputa!onal 
costs 
















Figure 1. Initial programme theory.
Explanation of visual programme theory: ‘Citizen engagement, backed by formal accountability measures and oversight (including enforcement and credible
sanctions) by civil society, media, the judiciary or governmental actors (C), can shift incentives for providers by fear for exposure, public or professional reprisal
and reputational cost of being sanctioned (M) leading to provider responsiveness (O).’ Responsiveness is defined as the actual implementation of changes to
service delivery. We also assumed that citizen engagement without additional oversight mechanisms would not lead to responsiveness or would lead to a mini-
mum level of responsiveness (‘receptivity’) at best. This initial hypothesis (see also Lodenstein et al. 2013) was based on insights from several authors (e.g.
McGee and Gaventa 2011; McLoughlin and Batley 2012; Acosta et al. 2013; Joshi et al. 2013; Fox 2015).
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use of qualitative coding software, MaxQDA. For objective 3, data
extraction was guided by a coding framework that provided defin-
itions and examples of Cs at micro-, meso- and macro-levels, and
examples of Ms and Os with ‘responsiveness’ as the main outcome
of interest (see Table 1). These guiding definitions were refined as
data extraction progressed.
A word table was used in which all CMO passages were ex-
tracted, either as full CMOs or as individual Cs, Ms or Os. For each
paper, data extraction and commenting were done independently by
two authors. The authors compared and discussed their findings,
and tried to reach consensus on the most important evidence pre-
sented in each paper. The initial programme theory (Figure 1) was
used as a tracer CMO to which associated or new CMOs were
added.
During analysis, the outcomes served as starting points for con-
figuring CMOs through retroductive analysis whereby the circum-
stances under which a concept (e.g. responsiveness) occurs are
identified in a backwards approach (Meyer and Lunnay 2013). This
allowed the formulation of multiple CMOs. Patterns in CMOs
called ‘demi-regularities’ were identified and built as evidence by
data triangulation from different papers and by triangulating analyt-
ical methods. Retroduction was complemented by downstream and
midstream analysis whereby respectively contexts and mechanisms
were taken as starting points (Tilly 1999). Cross-validation between
positive and negative outcomes was also done. Six CMOs were
selected for synthesis and presentation in the Results section, based
on the richness of, and patterns in, available evidence.
Results
The Results section first presents an overview of the features of the
social accountability initiatives as well as the responsiveness out-
comes. This is followed by six sets of explanations (CMOs) that ap-
pear critical to the outcomes identified. At the end of this section,
the findings are summarized and compared with our initial theory to
develop a new programme theory.
Features of social accountability initiatives
Social accountability initiatives with responsiveness outcomes are
presented in Annex S2 by name, health domain, country, type of ac-
tions and outcomes (see supplementary file S2). Figure 3 provides a
summary of some of these features. The majority of the initiatives
are located in South Asia and East Africa. Social accountability ac-
tions occur in different health domains and the majority addresses
problems in primary health care. The others focus on reproductive
health care, including maternal health services or HIV/AIDS, nutri-
tion and mental health. There are six types of social accountability
initiators including health committees, district health boards, non-
Figure 2. Diagram of the search, screening, selection and inclusion process.
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governmental organizations (NGOs) and CSOs and their networks.
In this article, the term CSO will be further used to refer to both
NGOs and CSOs. In eight cases, community groups were newly es-
tablished to facilitate a social accountability project. In many cases,
actions are initiated in partnerships between organizations, also
including governmental actors.
There is wide variation in the types of social accountability strat-
egies used by citizens. These strategies can be categorized according
to key steps in accountability: information collection and analysis,
presentation to officials or providers, action planning or negotiation,
and follow-up where there has been an unsatisfactory outcome of
the previous phases. Table 2 presents the type of actions within each
of these steps. The actions are further classified on the basis of their
approach (dialogue, advocacy), locus of action (local or subna-
tional), initiating group (CSOs, NGOs or community-based groups,
such as health committees) and target groups (frontline service pro-
viders, political and policy actors).
Actions at the health facility level often use a dialogue or partici-
patory approach in which data collection occurs through observa-
tion, quality scoring in group discussions or interviews, problem
analysis in participatory action research, and action planning at
interface meetings between citizens and health providers. At that
level, the main social accountability ‘targets’ are health workers and
managers. Some initiatives (right column) use an advocacy approach
in which citizens present their evaluation or claims in public hear-
ings, demonstrations, or media reports. At that level, initiatives tend
to target multiple public actors, such as providers as well as policy-
makers and politicians.
The categories of action, action levels and targets are not mutually
exclusive. Some initiatives use a combination of methods and operate
at multiple levels. A CSO in Bangladesh, for example, conducts daily
quality monitoring in the hospital. This monitoring is complemented
by visits to the hospital by municipal representatives, and their obser-
vations of service failure and success are regularly covered by the
media (Mukhopadhyay and Meer 2004). In the case of Shukla et al.
(2013), multi-level accountability is integrated into the design
whereby the unresolved issues of local public hearings are discussed
at higher-level public hearings where health authorities are present. In
addition to facilitating dialogue or engaging in lobby and advocacy,
some citizen groups provide health services. In this study, the level of
action, approach, types of initiator and target group are considered to
be micro-contextual elements.
Overview of responsiveness outcomes
The papers report three types of responsiveness outcomes at service
provision level of which the majority is positive. Table 3 provides def-
initions and examples of outcomes for each of these categories.
Increased ‘receptivity’ (O1) is observed in changes in attitudes of pro-
viders towards citizen groups or in increased awareness and recogni-
tion of service challenges. ‘Responsiveness’ (O2) translates into
changes in health provider behaviour, involving concrete action to im-
prove service provision in line with citizens’ concerns. Negative out-
comes refer to ignoring citizens’ demands resulting in continued poor
access or quality. The third category is concerned with changes in!ac-
countability relations’ (O3) between communities and service pro-
viders. The negative outcomes in this category are usually formulated
as ‘continued tensions between communities and health workers’. The
three types of outcomes are closely linked but distinct in terms of the
‘object’ of change (O1 and O2 concern health providers, O3 concerns
changes in both providers and communities) and in the ‘content’ of
change (O2 concerns changes in access and quality of services, O3 con-
cerns changes to governance or accountability relations).




‘Features of the conditions in which
programmes are introduced that
are relevant to the operation of the
programme mechanisms’ (Pawson
and Tilley 2004, p. 7). ‘Anything
that can trigger and/or modify the
behaviour of a mechanism’
(Jagosh et al. 2011, p. 7).
Reasoning of participants prompted
by the provision of resources,
opportunities and constraints.
Reasoning in the sense of logic-in-
use, cognition, values, emotions
(Westhorp 2014).
Outcomes are either intended or unex-
pected, and defined as either inter-






Three levels of context
(1) Micro-level: social account-
ability initiatives: type and fea-
tures of initiator, type of actions
and practices
(2) Meso-level: structure, culture
and practices of the health system,
including accountability actions of
authorities, interventions of other
parties, local political alteration,
health system reforms
(3) Macro-level: the legal and his-
torical context of citizen engage-
ment, social norms and values,
political ideology, economy
The precedents of provider respon-
siveness. The cognitive, pragmatic,
emotional responses of health pro-
viders who (are invited to) engage
in a social accountability initia-
tive. Descriptions of interpret-
ations, perceptions, feelings, acts
with regard to social accountabil-
ity initiators and actions (micro-
level) and other meso- and macro-
level contexts.
Responsiveness: the extent to which a
health provider demonstrates!receptiv-
ity’ to the ideas and concerns raised by
citizens and to which he/she (intends
to, or actually) ‘implements changes’ to
the decision-making or management
structure, culture, policies or practices
or by ‘changing behaviour’ at the point
of service. (Not: a dimension of quality
of care, patient-centeredness or the
quality of patient–provider interaction
at a more individual level).
Responsiveness outcomes can be both
positive and negative (no response or
negative response).
Health providers can refer to both indi-
vidual health workers as well as the or-
ganizations that provide services in a
public health facility at the local level.
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Contexts and mechanisms influencing
responsiveness outcomes
In the next section, we offer an explanation for outcomes by propos-
ing links between contexts, mechanisms and outcomes. The evidence
is presented under six themes which refer to the main mechanisms at
play. Each theme is introduced by a synthesized CMO configuration,
followed by supporting evidence and links to quotes. In most cases, it
was difficult to disaggregate the evidence per category of outcome be-
cause the papers do not specify conditions under which attitudinal,
behavioural or relational outcomes occur. This is why some CMOs
include multiple Os that are formulated in Boolean (and/or) terms.
Provider’s perceptions and expectations of health
service users
CMO1. Many social accountability initiatives operate in health sys-
tems that are characterized by a power asymmetry between pro-
viders and service users (C). This influences providers’ expectations
of the role of service users in the monitoring and oversight of health
services (M) and hence their responsiveness to groups engaging in
social accountability initiatives (O1, O2, O3).
The responsiveness of providers is likely to depend on whether
they perceive users of health services as patients, recipients, benefi-
ciaries, clients, consumers, citizens or holders of rights (Dasgupta
2011; Coe 2013). For example, in the context of free healthcare in
Bangladesh, providers tend to view users as recipients (Mahmud
2007). This view is strengthened by the ‘common belief in society
that not everyone has equal rights; and, concomitantly, denial of
rights is accepted as the natural order of things’ (Schurmann and
Mahmud 2009, p. 541). Jones et al. (2007) report that both
providers and community members in health committees in
India see themselves, respectively, as experts and beneficiaries.
Rutebemberwa et al. (2009) explain how such perceptions in
Uganda express existing power relations as illustrated by this quote
from a community member: ‘It is us, the patients, who should bend
low for the health workers because it is them who went to school,
they know where life is and they are the people God gave the gift of
saving people’ (p. 151). In such contexts, communities and providers
often expect patients to be grateful for services, regardless of per-
ceived quality. Wendland (2010) notes that in Malawi, clinicians are
aware of the power asymmetry between them and their patients but
they interpret it in two ways. On the one hand, providers acknow-
ledge that feelings of superiority may harm patients. On the other
hand, they suggest that their position allows them to defend voice-
less patients vis-!a-vis the health system and the government.
Furthermore, expectations of the role of patients reflect the percep-
tion of providers that the oversight of health services is not a com-
munity responsibility but rather a responsibility of health managers
or government (Macwan’gi and Ngwengwe 2004; Mahmud 2007;
Ngulube et al. 2004; Ruano et al. 2014; Curry et al. 2012).
Providers’ perceptions of health service users as patients are likely to
influence their attitudes to citizen groups and social accountability.
Providers’ perceptions of the legitimacy
of citizen groups
CMO 2. Citizen groups engaged in social accountability actions
may generate provider receptivity (O1) if providers perceive them as
legitimate (M). Accorded legitimacy depends on the way providers
perceive and value (M) the formal mandate, capacities, internal con-
sensus and genuine concern of groups, and citizen groups’ role in
service delivery (C).
Some papers consider legitimacy in terms of laws that provide citizen
groups with formal powers to call public officials and workers to ac-
count. Where governments provide a legal status for citizen mobilization
and monitoring, as well as procedures for grievance redressal, health
workers and officials are more likely to respect citizen groups’ decisions
and respond to their actions (Mukhopadhyay 2003; Ngulube et al.
2004; Jones et al. 2007; Mahmud 2007; Misra and Ramasankar 2007;
Schurmann and Mahmud 2009). Other authors refer to legitimacy of
citizen groups in terms of ‘reputation’ (Mukhopadhyay and Meer 2004),






















































Figure 3. Features of the included social accountability initiatives.
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‘representative legitimacy’ (Ngulube et al. 2004). Four attributes of citi-
zen groups are identified that determine this type of legitimacy.
First, the perceived poor capacities of health committee members
are often cited as barriers to good collaboration with providers. In
some contexts, individuals are nominated because of their socio-
economic or political status rather than on their affinity to health
care. Providers perceive such individuals as not sufficiently know-
ledgeable, interested, competent or professional to take decisions on
health issues and service delivery (Macwan’gi and Ngwengwe 2004;
Williams 2007; Leppard et al. 2011; Meier et al. 2012; Jones et al.
2013). This appears less applicable to some CSOs with a subnational
coverage, with long-standing experience, and which providers per-
ceive as specialists in the field (Mukhopadhyay and Meer 2004).
Health providers and authorities may value the expert knowledge of
these organizations, including knowledge about marginalized groups
that providers often lack themselves (Spicer et al. 2011). Second, apart
from capacity and experience, the genuine concern of citizen groups
appears crucial for providers’ levels of responsiveness. This applies to
both poor and ‘uneducated’ members (Goodman et al. 2011) and to
members that belong to economically privileged groups (Williams
2007). Third, providers’ receptivity to citizen groups’ claims depends
on the level of internal consensus or ‘unity’ among group members.
Spicer et al. (2011) describe how the competition for scarce resources
and the lack of ideological consensus lead to rivalry among CSO lead-
ers in a HIV/AIDS coalition in Georgia. This makes health officials
less willing to engage with them: ‘There were reported examples of
heated, public exchanges, often in the presence of government offi-
cials, which reaffirmed their [government officials’] caution about
working with civil society’ (p. 1753). Fourth, citizen groups them-
selves sometimes engage in the provision of health services in addition
Table 2. Types of social accountability actions
Steps in
accountability#
Approach: dialogue Approach: advocacy
Information collection Facility co-management meetings
(11–14,16,20,21,26,29,33,35)
Large-scale surveys (5,10,23,25)
Monitoring in health centres/specific services
(1,2,3,6–8,17,26,27,29,31,34,35)
Maternal death audits (8)
Scoring/evaluation in groups
(7,10,24,27,28,31)
Collection of testimonies (5)
Collection of user complaints
(4,14,15,19,20,26,35,37)
Presentation/negotiation Training of health providers (21)
Joint problem analysis with providers
and other stakeholders
(1–4,9,10,18,19,21,24,28,30–32,34–36)
Joint planning with providers
and other stakeholders (10,18,28,32)
Independent analysis—formulation
of statements and claims (5,23,25)
Radio broadcasting (29)
Presentation in public hearings, demonstrations,
protests, media reports (1,5–8,23,35)
Follow-up/enforcement Involvement of political or
administrative parties (1,5,23)
Other characteristics Initiator: community groups/committees Initiator: CSO/NGO
Locus: health facility Locus: sub-national
Target: frontline service providers providers Target: providers, policymakers, politicians
Table 3. Definitions and examples of positive (þ) and negative (-) responsiveness outcomes
Receptivity (O1) Responsiveness (O2) Relations (O3)
Changes in attitudes of providers to-
wards citizen groups.
Changes in behaviour by taking concrete action to
improve service provision in line with citizens’
concerns.
Changes in (accountability) relations between com-
munities and service providers.
þ Reduced hostility towards health
watch groups
þ Recognition of discrimination
þ Awareness of performance gaps
þ Apologies or intentions and
promises to improve
þ Acceptance of alternative treat-
ment practices
# Lack of consideration of health
committee members opinions
Access:
þ Reduced provider absenteeism; increased
outreach
þ Decrease of informal payments
þ Reduced drug stock-outs
Quality:
þ Improved provider–patient communication
through involvement of translators or trad-
itional health practitioners
þ Better queue management and increase in
consultation rooms
# Persistence of corruption and poor quality;
particularly for poor women
Relations in general:
þ Improved links and reduced conflicts between
communities and health workers
þ Mutual respect; interaction between com-
monly disparate groups
Accountability tools:
þ Introduction of a grievances and complaints
system, suggestion box, quality of care com-
mittees, transparency measures, expansion of
public hearings
# Concealing medical evidence on maternal
deaths; barring entrance to facility
# Arbitrary and frequent audits of CSO by
government
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to monitoring and advocacy work. In some cases, providers value and
accept CSOs as partners in service provision because they fill a cap-
acity or knowledge gap. This partnership, then, offers opportunities
for CSO advocacy, helping CSOs to put issues on the government
agenda (G"omez-Jauregui 2008; Evensen and Stokke 2010; Spicer
2011). At health facility level, health committees often have the offi-
cial mandate to support health service delivery, including the monitor-
ing of the quality of care. The advocacy role of health committees,
however, is often loosely defined and interpreted while the service de-
livery role tends to be emphasized. For example, soon after the instal-
lation of health committees in Zambia, district health authorities
reiterated that the committees’ key role is to work with health centre
managers to solve local problems (Ngulube et al. 2004). For commit-
tee members themselves, according to Jones et al. (2007), ‘effective
monitoring is considered a more demanding task in the context of per-
ceived social and professional superiority of health workers. Providing
auxiliary services becomes the safe option’ (p. 222). Hence, compared
with CSOs operating at a larger scale, health committees’ strong con-
tributions to service delivery may not strengthen their legitimacy or
opportunities for more oversight or advocacy roles.
Providers’ feelings of support, safety and appreciation
CMO 3. Social accountability initiatives may generate provider re-
ceptivity (O1) and improved relations (O3) when providers feel sup-
ported and appreciated and when they experience the discussion
platform as safe (M). This is most likely to occur in actions that
emphasize information sharing and dialogue between communities
and health providers, that are void of open public critique, and that
provide the opportunity for providers to defend themselves and to
address their own concerns as well (C).
From the perspective of health providers, initiatives that use infor-
mation sharing and dialogue approaches appear effective in several
ways. First, when data collection and analysis of health services are
rarely done within the health system, providers welcome these initia-
tives. They appreciate the identification of gaps in performance to im-
prove their health facility (Papp et al. 2013). Health managers, in
particular, appreciate citizen monitoring as it supports them in their
control over staff. They hope that citizen groups can transform the so-
cial skills of health workers and reduce the reliance on transfers to re-
mote areas as an extreme solution to deal with poorly performing
workers (Ngulube et al. 2004; Golooba-Mutebi 2005). Second, pro-
viders are more likely to participate when their priorities and worries
about working conditions are listened to and addressed
(Mukhopadhyay and Meer 2004; Williams 2007). To make sure their
issues are addressed, some providers prefer to be involved in agenda
setting for the monitoring exercise or data collection (Mahmud 2007;
Williams 2007). Third, providers are more likely to engage in social ac-
countability initiatives when the approach protects the facility and its
staff from public critique. For this reason, a CSO in Maharashtra,
India, transformed ‘public hearings’ into ‘public dialogues’ in which
they discouraged speakers from ‘making unsubstantiated allegations’
and from using ‘derogatory and abusive language’ (Shukla et al. 2013,
p. 18). In one Indian case, providers and authorities would only engage
in a social audit if working principles were agreed upon upfront,
including an assurance that there would be no retributive action against
frontline staff if service inadequacies were exposed (Swain and Sen
2009). Health workers in Uganda also wanted to be able to respond to
issues brought forward. For example, social accountability initiatives
that use radio shows to discuss hospital performance without inviting
health workers to explain and respond are considered inappropriate
(Rutebemberwa et al. 2009). Finally, some initiatives congratulate
providers publicly for their good performance and for following up on
community demands; this kind of appreciation and social reward is
likely to enhance responsiveness (Ngulube et al. 2004; Shukla et al.
2013).
Providers’ fear of repercussions from
influential third parties
CMO 4. Social accountability actions may generate provider re-
sponsiveness (O1 and/or O2) when these initiatives trigger providers’
fear of repercussions for the poor performance of health services
(M). Citizen groups are not likely to generate this mechanism on
their own; they require the involvement of influential third parties
(C) that each trigger a particular mechanism of fear of repercussions
(M).
Papers report on the involvement of three types of influential
third parties to increase pressure on providers: politicians, media
and health authorities. These groups of actors mediate provider re-
sponsiveness in different ways.
With regard to politicians, Mukhopadhyay and Meer (2004) dem-
onstrate that a CSO invites elected representatives to regularly moni-
tor the hospital which ‘acted as a pressure in ensuring that women
received better quality care, and resulted in improved hygiene and
cleanliness . . . based on the power of ‘public mandate’ that elected
representatives bring with them’ (p. 126). Few other cases report on
the use of political capital to strengthen the social monitoring of ser-
vices. Jones et al. (2007), for example, found that health committee
leaders who have links with political authorities use these relations
for personal access to health care rather than for collective calls for
the improvement of services. Political affiliation can also have the re-
verse effect in India or Uganda. In these cases, poorly behaving health
workers do not change behaviour because they are protected by a
powerful politician who might also have facilitated their appointment
(Golooba-Mutebi 2005; Shukla et al. 2013).
Women’s rights organizations in India use the media to share tes-
timonies of poor women who are denied health services (Dasgupta
2011) or to enhance the coverage and credibility of their social ac-
countability efforts (Papp et al. 2013; Shukla et al. 2013). In
Bangladesh, the involvement of journalists is particularly useful in
generating responsiveness of providers (Mukhopadhyay 2003;
Mukhopadhyay and Meer 2004). Journalists provide media cover-
age of new agreements and norms set up by monitoring groups and
providers, and they are also present at meetings and in hospitals and
can broadcast their observations of corruption and misbehaviour.
This improves the professional behaviour of the doctors ‘since any-
one violating the norms risked exposure and public embarrassment’
(Mukhopadhyay 2003, p. 50). The set-up of public hearings in India
has a similar effect as media coverage: it creates mass attention and
therefore creates popular pressure on providers (Papp et al. 2013).
The involvement of ‘health authorities’ occurs most often in situ-
ations where initial citizen action has no effect. Health authorities
are the only institutions reported as being able to sanction health
workers. Cases from Zambia, Malawi, India and Bangladesh report
on the transfer of misbehaving health workers or health workers
who are regularly absent or refuse to work by district health author-
ities (Macwan’gi and Ngwengwe 2004; Dasgupta 2011; Barpanda
et al. 2013; Jones et al. 2013; Shukla et al. 2013). In these papers,
transfers are presented as results; there is no evidence of the mechan-
ism ‘fear of the threat of transfer’ leading to responsiveness. Some
authors believe that this fear is either non-existent or an insufficient
incentive in contexts where postings, transfers and the discipline of
health workers are characterized by patronage or corruption
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(Macwan’gi and Ngwengwe 2004; George et al. 2005; Dasgupta
2011).
Health provider responsiveness may hence be mediated by the
relative power of social accountability initiators vis-a-vis other
powerful groups. Some social accountability initiatives purposefully
involve different third parties simultaneously, each for a particular
purpose (Mukhopadhyay and Meer 2004; Papp et al. 2013; Shukla
et al. 2013). Most cases, however, did not describe the strategic con-
siderations for involving third parties.
Providers’ feelings of moral obligation
CMO 5. Social accountability actions may generate provider re-
sponsiveness (O1 and/or O2) when these initiatives are able to trig-
ger providers’ feelings of moral responsibility or obligation (M).
Citizen groups are likely to be able to trigger such feelings when
they use frames that correspond to providers’ frames (C).
Some citizen groups use frames to strengthen citizens’ claims in
the public discourse on health and health services. Frames are used
to describe behaviour, social accountability objectives, and ideolo-
gies or paradigms.
A CSO in Bangladesh involves a member of parliament (MP) in
its campaign to improve the quality of health services. It is not just
the presence of the MP that puts pressure on the health providers
but also the framing of behaviour of health providers. Providers are
sensitive to the rhetoric of the MP who, in one of his statements, de-
scribes doctors as ‘ungrateful’ (educated on public money but refus-
ing to serve the people), ‘arrogant’ (demanding to be addressed as
‘Sir’), and ‘extortionist’ (asking for informal payments), exerting
moral pressure (Mukhopadhyay and Meer 2004, p. 127).
The framing of the objectives of social accountability also ap-
pears to play a role. Providers and authorities in an Indian case agree
to a social audit if it is aimed at identifying systemic failures, at in-
forming the public of the services available and at capacity
strengthening of cadres, rather than at monitoring the performance
of frontline staff (Swain and Sen 2009).
In the field of reproductive health, the importance of framing is
also underscored. Carino et al. (2008) observe that providers in
Uruguay are more willing to advise women on safe abortion if abor-
tion is framed from a professional ‘do-no-harm’ perspective, rather
than from the perspective of rights. In Peru, Coe (2013) established
that health authorities were initially receptive to CSO demands to
introduce legal abortion because their own frame of women’s
human rights reflects the CSO’s feminist frame.
Providers’ self-perceived capacity and identity
CMO 6. Many social accountability initiatives operate in health sys-
tems that are characterized by a strong internal hierarchical organ-
ization (C). This context influences providers’ perceptions on their
capacities to achieve change (M). Social accountability initiatives in
these contexts may generate responsiveness outcomes and improved
relations (O1 and/or O2 and/or O3) if providers identify with the
citizen group and its ideals or claims (M). This is likely to be facili-
tated when social accountability initiatives (C) build on/are
embedded in large-scale societal and political change (C).
The professional hierarchies in many health systems appear to
influence the degree to which different categories of health pro-
viders are able to respond to citizen’s initiatives. Cornwall et al.
(2006) describe how active participation of health worker repre-
sentatives in health councils often contrasts with managers’ lack of
commitment and respect for council members. It is often lower-
level (e.g. community health workers) or younger health workers
who are delegated with the task of attending community meetings.
Even when they are dedicated to participation, such health work-
ers are reserved in meetings, not due to poor technical knowledge
or experience but due to a lack of decision-making power
(Ngulube et al. 2004; Cornwall 2007; Nair and Campbell 2008).
The fact that many local health workers are on short-term con-
tracts also prevents them from investing in building effective com-
munity relations (Bowyer 2004; Golooba-Mutebi 2005; Cornwall
2007) and from speaking out for fear of dismissal (Cornwall
2007). Wendland (2010) describes how Malawian medical stu-
dents have strong ambitions to fight the injustices in the health sec-
tor but that they feel it is politically dangerous to engage in
collective action. Health workers feel that they have to be diplo-
matic in their communication with superiors, preventing them
from reporting grassroots’ views to their seniors and limiting the
possibilities for responsiveness to communities (Cornwall 2007;
Nair and Campbell 2008).
In some circumstances, the institutional culture of a health
system is challenged, as illustrated by cases from Peru, Brazil and
South Africa. In these countries, due to large societal and polit-
ical change, providers are likely to develop a high self-perceived
capacity to achieve change (Delgado-Gallego and Vazquez-
Navarrette 2009). In Peru, Coe (2013) observes that health
authorities and CSOs find a strong common ground in their
shared history of political activism against authoritarian rule and
in their current resistance to the new liberal government. As a
consequence, health authorities are supporting coalitions for re-
productive rights, including those advocating for safe abortions.
Cornwall (2007 2008) and Cornwall et al. (2006) find that many
providers in Brazil have affective bonds with activist movements
because they were part of them themselves and, therefore, iden-
tify with citizen members in some health councils. These pro-
viders experience the failures in the system and have loyalties to
patients and communities. They consider that health councils are
opportunities for them to demonstrate their passion for politics.
Evensen and Stokke (2010) and Campbell and Ballantyne (2004)
describe a similar ‘identification’ mechanism in their cases in
South Africa. Some health providers were formerly activists in
the Treatment Action Campaign, a CSO founded in 1998 to cam-
paign for access to treatment for AIDS. These providers share the
conviction that ARV treatment is a human right and that exclusion
from access to treatment is a new form of ‘Apartheid’. They are of
the opinion that, as a powerful actor in society, they have the ethical
responsibility to challenge the status quo. In both Brazil and South
Africa, this translates into providers bypassing governments’ restrict-
ive policies by distributing or administering inaccessible drugs,
thereby being responsive to citizens’ demands, in particular to the
poor (Biehl 2004; Campbell and Ballantyne 2004). Campbell and
Ballantyne (2004) find in their study, however, that it is only some
providers who consider themselves as advocates. Others comply
with the status quo. Rather than spending time on advocacy, pro-
viders learn to cope with the unavailability of some (HIV/AIDS)
interventions and concentrate on services that are available. This
coping mechanism is also found in other cases that describe
resource-constrained settings such as Niger and Malawi (Jacob et al.
2009; Wendland 2010). Faced with a lack of resources and poor
working conditions, most clinicians still opt to offer the minimum of
services, rather than to leave the facility or engage in collective pro-
tests. In under-resourced settings in Peru, Bowyer (2004) describes
health providers being unreceptive to greater inputs from commu-
nity because new demands cannot be integrated or followed up,
even if providers wanted to.
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Proposed programme theory for provider
responsiveness
The six CMOs previously presented are summarized and visualized
in a causal diagram in Figure 4. The arrows towards the outcomes
represent the six CMOs: potential pathways to receptivity and re-
sponsiveness departing from the micro-context (social accountabil-
ity initiatives), meso-context (health system context) or macro-
context (broader social and political context). At the centre, the out-
comes are variable; through an interaction of multiple contexts and
mechanisms, they can be (temporarily) present or absent, or change
from one to the other.
The micro-level pathways generated by information sharing and
dialogue approaches to social accountability and by the involvement
of third parties inform our main initial hypothesis. The evidence il-
lustrates how information sharing and dialogue approaches can con-
tribute to provider receptivity. The evidence demonstrates further
nuances on how enforcement through third parties works by specify-
ing the variations and effect of ‘fear of reprisal’. Framing and its
mechanism of moral obligation as an aspect of social accountability
approaches emerged as a new element to our initial hypothesis. The
meso- and macro-pathways help to make concrete what it is in the
broader contextual features that matter for social accountability
initiatives.
The evidence presented in the previous sections suggests that at-
tributes and approaches of citizen groups, as well as health system
and societal features, can each trigger certain mechanisms leading to
outcomes. The CMOs in the diagram, however, should not be read
in isolation. Contexts and mechanisms may be complementary (e.g.
perceived legitimacy, feeling supported) as well as contradictory
(e.g. high self-identification, low self-perceived capacity), taking
place simultaneously, sequentially or not taking place at all. The
interaction between mechanisms (represented by the arrows between
CMOs) may explain the variation in responsiveness outcomes (re-
ceptivity vs responsiveness and/or relational outcomes) as well as
the variation of responsiveness among categories of providers. The
diagram does not present the time dimension that would further
show the dynamics of change: CMOs may be relevant at one point
in time but less in another.
In view of the findings, and as a textual interpretation of the dia-
gram, a revised programme theory is formulated starting from the
micro-level up to the meso- and macro-levels, and taking the mech-
anisms as main points of interest:
health providers are likely to be receptive to (O1) and/or act upon
(O2) citizens’ demands for better health care if health providers
perceive the social accountability initiative as legitimate (M), and/
or if they experience the social accountability approach as safe
and supportive to their personal and professional needs (M), and/
or if they feel appreciated for their work (M) and/or if the ap-
proach appeals to their feelings of moral obligation (M). The in-
volvement of specific third parties can generate additional pres-
sure in the form of fear for public or professional reprisals (M).
Additional favourable contexts for health provider responsiveness
are socio-political contexts in which some providers self-identify
as activists or citizens (M), identify health service users as citizens
(M) and/or health system contexts in which some health providers
depend on citizens’ expertise and capacities and/or have the self-
perceived ability to change the system in which they operate (M).
Discussion
The findings of this review contribute to the literature on social ac-
countability in low- and middle-income countries in three ways.
First, the findings focus on the effect of social accountability at
the frontline of service provision. This is the level where health
Figure 4. Visual representation of proposed programme theory.
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providers frequently experience demands from societal actors and
where change towards more responsive healthcare is supposed to
occur. The findings suggest a more nuanced view of the ‘other side
of the equation’ (Gaventa 2004), the individuals or groups that are
targeted in social accountability initiatives. By analysing provider
perspectives, reasoning, agency and abilities, one might gain a more
complete picture of the potential of social accountability. Second,
the findings present a range of social accountability initiatives and a
range of possible outcomes, including improved quality, accessibility
and governance of health services. This review contributes to on-
going efforts to assess social accountability initiatives and their ef-
fects. Rather than judging whether or not social accountability
initiatives work, this review aims to understand the processes that
lead to responsiveness outcomes and how broader factors interact
with these processes and outcomes. This is the third and main con-
tribution of this article. By putting mechanisms centre stage, the
paper operationalizes the commonly mentioned contextual factors
influencing health provider responsiveness. Although the proposed
programme theory is preliminary and non-exhaustive, it provides a
new analytical tool to understand the dynamics of many different
approaches that fall under the umbrella term social accountability
and to understand the interaction between contextual factors.
The available evidence in this review informs the commonly held
assumption that citizen-led accountability initiatives work through
‘soft’ pressure (McGee and Gaventa 2011) by generating feelings of
support and safety or by triggering moral or ethical values in pro-
viders. These mechanisms may lead to providers’ receptivity or
openness to engage with citizen groups and to awareness on service
users’ perspectives and needs. The reliance of citizen groups on soft
methods of persuasion, for example, through dialogue, is often con-
sidered a weakness of social accountability (McNeil and Malena
2010). Without the threat of sanctions by political or bureaucratic
authorities, social accountability is difficult to sustain in the long
run and only able to address superficial service delivery challenges
(Joshi 2013; Berlan and Shiffman 2012; Acosta et al. 2013;
Freedman and Schaaf 2013). Rather than emphasizing the limits of
social accountability, we suggest to rethink expected impact or out-
comes of such initiatives. What is superficial or significant depends
on context and time as illustrated by examples.
Social accountability initiatives in South Africa and Brazil
derived much of their transformative power from wider changes in
health system policies and legislation, and from an intensive period
of democratic transition in society as a whole. This allowed cross
boundary alliances to emerge between civil actors and state reform-
ists, which O’Meally (2013) calls ‘pro-accountability coalitions’.
However, as time passes, the effectiveness of civil society in bringing
about change may also change. For example, according to Jonsson
and Jonsson (2012), HIV/AIDS activism in South Africa has become
more reactive and less pro-active since the advent of majority rule.
This careful interpretation of outcomes is equally important in other
governance settings.
Many of the cases in this review are located in contexts where
citizen groups have fewer opportunities for multi-level coalition
building, where providers have less experience with organized feed-
back from citizens, or where regulatory capacities of the health sec-
tor are weak. In such contexts, basic outcomes like ‘presence, or
more respectful behaviour of health workers’ or ‘increased job mo-
tivation’ can still be quite significant. Also, the ‘relational’ outcomes
that we identified can be read as signs of a transformation of health
governance, albeit at localized sites and for an unknown period of
time. Tembo (2013) concludes from a study in six sub-Saharan
African countries that ‘soft’ approaches, involving informal
incentives, may provide a basis for building trust and for joint prob-
lem solving of unsatisfactory performance. He states that without a
basic level of trust, more formal enforcement approaches, including
sanctions, will be ineffective (Tembo 2013). Knox (2009), one of the
authors of a study in Bangladesh, considers trust-building
approaches at the micro-level particularly relevant in settings
characterized by political instability or poor trust among citizens.
This argument is also advanced by other scholars comparing con-
structive and fault finding or distrust-based approaches to social ac-
countability (Freedman 2003; Joshi and Houtzager 2012; Joshi
2013; Acosta et al. 2013; Grandvoinnet et al. 2015). In any govern-
ance setting, it is argued, over-reliance on one or the other approach
is not likely to promote systemic change (George et al. 2005). Thus,
apart from the need to evaluate the potential of social accountability
initiatives in their context, we argue that it is important to acknow-
ledge intermediate outcomes, including receptivity of providers and
other target groups of citizen advocacy. This aligns with calls of
other researchers to evaluate intermediate steps in the causal chain
of social accountability (Rocha Menocal and Sharma 2008; Joshi
2014).
Strengths and limitations of methods
and findings
To our knowledge, this is the first realist review applied to social ac-
countability initiatives in the health sector. The approach allowed
the accumulation and valorization of knowledge generated from a
range of sources, study designs and data in order to build plausible
theories. However, like other reviewers in the field (e.g. Joshi 2013)
we were confronted with the challenge of comparing cases and as-
sessing the quality of studies. With regard to comparative analysis,
for example, only 3 of 40 papers provided explicit definitions or
measures of outcomes, whereas the others provided narrative de-
scriptions of outcomes, sometimes only implicitly linking outcomes
with social accountability strategies. Hence, our evidence suggests
three types of outcomes that are difficult to link to a particular strat-
egy or ‘intervention component’. With regard to the assessment of
quality of individual papers and data, our approach was iterative.
We did not want to miss relevant papers by excluding them a priori
based on methodological rigour. Therefore, the appraisal of meth-
odological quality came after having established the relevance of
papers. The relevance of papers, in turn, could sometimes only be
assessed after multiple papers had been read. Our initial criteria for
methodological rigour (credibility and coherence of methods) were
also further defined as the review progressed. For example, for
papers that did not include a detailed methods section, or that were
retrospective and written by initiators themselves, we decided that
an important methodological criterion should be ‘author reflexivity’,
meaning that in at least one instance, authors should critically reflect
on the initiatives and their outcomes, for example, in the discussion
sections. This leads to the exclusion of three papers. We used inter-
reviewer reflexivity as much as possible in the process of appraisal
and configuring evidence. We did so by keeping track of important
discussions and decisions in a logbook. Hence, like other realist re-
viewers (e.g. Jagosh et al. 2014), we used existing guidelines for real-
ist synthesis as well as our own experience with the material to
define and customize our review methods. We are aware that, based
on critical decisions during the process, and in order to focus the re-
view, important themes and evidence were disregarded. They may
constitute material for separate syntheses. Also, we are aware that
broader consultation with practitioners and experts towards the end
136 Health Policy and Planning, 2017, Vol. 32, No. 1
of the synthesis process could have enriched or validated the evi-
dence. It is important to note, however, that, in the light of available
data and data types, realist review is a pragmatic approach that does
not aim to be comprehensive or to provide stable conclusions. The
value lies in understanding analytically defined mechanisms rather
than in the exact content of initiatives and outcomes that are contin-
gent on temporal changes in the context (Pawson and Tilley 1997).
The paper should hence be considered as a complementary effort to
understand complexity in evaluation in such broad fields as social
accountability.
Most social accountability initiatives in our review are facilitated
by formal, established or institutionalized NGOs, CSOs or health
committees. This is partly due to our search strategy and inclusion
criteria, and partly to the availability of documented evidence. Our
main focus was on the effect of organized citizen action on health
service providers, not on the preconditions needed for voice and so-
cial accountability to emerge. Therefore, these cases are located in
contexts where a minimum level of organization and voice is pre-
sent, and accessible for documentation. We further suppose that for-
mal citizen engagement or funded social accountability programmes
are more likely to be documented than more informal or temporary
forms of citizen advocacy. Therefore, our results probably do not do
justice to the broad scope of initiatives led by grassroots or self-help
groups (also beyond the health sector), ad hoc protest groups, or
campaigns through social media. The insights presented here could
provide a useful perspective on more informal forms of citizen en-
gagement as we consider that the mechanisms we have identified
may also be applicable to informal processes.
We further encountered a definitional, geographical and report-
ing bias in the material. Many studies referred to health facilities or
health providers in general terms without specifying the categories
of health workers or whether they were considered as individuals,
groups or organizations. This limits the scope of the findings.
Regarding geographical coverage, there is a striking gap in cases
from West and North Africa or the Middle East. This may be due to
our search strategy that focused on English-language literature.
Most cases are located in relatively stable governance settings,
which may limit the transferability of elements of the programme
theory to, for example, conflict-affected countries. Although many
mechanisms may be common to other settings, a wider range of so-
cietal, historical and health systems contexts might have led to the
identification of more specificity and strengthened the evidence
base. This, in combination with the fact that we found very few in-
stances of counterproductive effects or no effects, limited the possi-
bility to cross-validate our CMOs.
Implications for practice, policy and research
The ideas advanced in this review constitute a new avenue for build-
ing understanding of the complexity of social accountability. The
findings can support reflection and decision-making of researchers,
practitioners, evaluators and policymakers.
First, people involved in designing and implementing social ac-
countability initiatives can use the proposed programme theory to
interpret their own context, pathways to change and possible out-
comes. This type of reflection, in combination with their own ex-
perience and insights, will help to refine and tailor their social
accountability strategies to their unique contexts and hence generate
best-fit, rather than best-practice approaches (Leininger 2014).
Second, the findings demonstrate that health systems policy and re-
search needs to recognize that health systems are social institutions,
shaped by human agency (Sheikh et al. 2014). Programme designers
in governmental quality improvement programmes, HR depart-
ments and NGOs should take into account the perspectives of those
at the frontline of service provision, including the mechanisms lead-
ing to the acceptance of new ways to assess service delivery perform-
ance. Third, efforts to build responsive health services require a
synergy between institutional structures and external initiatives,
such as the ones described in this review. For policymakers in public
institutions, it might be useful to reflect on how this synergy can be
enhanced, for example, by assessing the complementarity between
internal and external accountability strategies in how they contrib-
ute to responsive health services. Finally, regarding implications for
research, we suggest to further develop the proposed programme
theory by enriching and validating it with existing theories and by
testing parts of it with empirical research. Further research could,
for example, focus on particular health service characteristics (e.g.
Batley and Harris 2014), social accountability initiators such as
health committees, local media or more informal citizen actions or
on regions not covered in this review. This will help in further con-
ceptualizing the constructs of, and associations between, social ac-
countability, receptivity and responsiveness in the health sector. As
this review has shown, such scholarship could benefit from perspec-
tives from political science, organizational sociology, philosophy
and social psychology.
Conclusion
This study brings together the knowledge generated from 37 social
accountability initiatives. The evidence demonstrates the contribu-
tion of local-level social accountability initiatives to the acceptability
and quality of health services, key values and immediate goals of
public health systems. This contribution is based on an ability to in-
fluence the values, perceptions, logic, expectations, and feelings of
providers towards citizen groups and their demands that are, in
turn, mediated by the larger health system and societal context. By
focusing on the provider perspective on citizen collective action, this
review covers an important gap in the social accountability literature
and contributes to thinking about interventions to improve the qual-
ity of primary health care more generally.
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